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1NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Twenty-two and a half billion pounds is a great deal of money to raise for selling air,
but that is what the British government raised in an auction for ﬁve telecom licences. The
auction ﬁnished on 27th April 2000, and was frequently described as the “biggest ever”.
We led the team that advised on the design of the British auction — sometimes called the
“3G auction”, and this paper summarises our experience.
Auctions are better than beauty contests
Auctions have many advantages over the alternative, the “beauty contest”, in which
a government committee awards licences to the ﬁrms whose business plans are considered
the best.
First, a well-designed auction squeezes information out of the bidders which would
never otherwise be available to the government, so is the best way to allocate licences to
the ﬁrms which are able to use them most valuably. Second, an auction is a transpar-
ently fair process, so minimises the political and legal controversy which can arise from
beauty contests, where there will always be a suspicion of favouritism. Third, an auction
raises money into the bargain which can be used to increase government spending, or to re-
duce taxes (most taxes cause distortions in the economy, but auctions for licences do not).
Auctions do not harm consumers, nor penalise incumbents
There are a number of common objections to auctions. One is that they are unfair
on incumbent ﬁrms, because they are committed to the market and are forced to bid. A
second argument is that the high licence fees will mean that ﬁrms have little money left
to invest in the new technology. A third is that consumers will suﬀer because prices will
be higher to cover the high costs of licences.
All of these arguments are based on misperceptions. For example, it was the high
bidding by new entrants which drove prices so high, which shows that ﬁrms not commit-
ted to the market were still willing to pay. And it is implausible that telecoms ﬁrms will
either forgo proﬁtable investments or charge less than the market will bear, regardless of
whether licences were cheap or expensive.
Encouraging entry is important
We felt strongly that questions of market structure were much more important than
2the issue of information, on which orthodox auction theory concentrates.
The most important issue of all was to encourage new players to bid in the auction.
There was a serious risk that only the incumbents would bother to submit bids, because
a potential entrant would not suﬀer the expense of preparing bids if it had little chance
of winning. Our initial design was a two-stage auction, called an “Anglo-Dutch” auction,
speciﬁcally designed to promote entry.
Diﬀerent situations need diﬀerent auctions
We were able to replace the Anglo-Dutch design with a simpler auction when it became
clear that suﬃcient licences would be available to tempt entrants. Auction design is a
case of “horses for courses”; we altered our plans when circumstances changed. Later, the
Dutch government faced the scenario which we had feared (selling four licences to four
incumbents) but instead of using a design to promote entry, they used an open ascending
auction. This design worked well in the UK and badly in the Netherlands — a result which
we predicted in advance.
The open ascending auction which worked well in the UK case is a little like those
used in Sotheby’s or Christies, but instead of one auction there were ﬁve going on at the
same time. If a company was neither winning nor bidding in one of the auctions it would
have to withdraw. This design allowed companies to be ﬂexible about which licence was
a target, and also meant that intense competition for the licence we had reserved for
entrants would spill over, and mean higher prices for the other licences too.
The small print is important, too
Getting the small print right turned out to be just as important as some of the big
design questions. We devoted a lot of time and eﬀort — rightly, in our opinion — to ensuring
that there were no loopholes.
Other issues we had to grapple with included whether to use royalty payments, how
to determine the number of licences, how to ensure a new entrant would be guaranteed
“roaming” on an incumbent’s 2G network, and how to handle “associated” bidders whose
ownership is shared.
Experiments help
Experimental testing in the laboratory and in computer simulations was very helpful.
It helped us test our theories, but did much more than that. Experiments are much more
3persuasive than showing them equations, so experimental work helped get our advice ac-
cepted. The simulations were also very useful in helping us evaluate a diﬃcult situation
— Vodafone’s hostile bid for Mannesmann, which would mean that two of the key bidders
in the auction had the same owner at the time the auction took place. The experimental
work reassured us that this would not seriously damage the eﬃciency of the auction.
The outcome
The UK auction ran very smoothly, there was enthusiastic entry and — famously —
bidding ran high.
Many of the subsequent European auctions did not run so smoothly. In the Nether-
lands an “oﬀ-the-shelf” design, with little thought given to promoting entry, resulted in
little competition and low prices. Similar results aﬄicted Italy and Switzerland. Mean-
while a loophole in the rules of the Turkish auction was successfully exploited to secure a
monopoly position, and an auction which was vulnerable to collusion yielded a very poor
outcome in Austria.
These auctions also conﬁrmed our views that industrial structure is a critical issue in
auction design, and that the worst mistake in running an auction is just to take an auction
design oﬀ the shelf. Auctions need to be tailored to ﬁt the situation, and economists can
prevent some very costly mistakes.
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Twenty-two and a half billion pounds (34 billion dollars) is a great deal of money to
raise for selling air, but that is what the British government raised in an auction for ﬁve
telecom licences.1 The auction ran from 6th March to 27th April 2000, and was frequently
described as the “biggest ever”–not since the Praetorian Guard knocked down the entire
Roman Empire to Didius Julianus in AD 195 had there been an auction quite as large.2
We led the team that advised on the design of the British auction (the “third-
generation mobile spectrum licence auction”, or “3G auction”, or “UMTS auction”).3
This paper summarizes our experience.4
1 Background
In 1997, when our advice was ﬁrst sought, four mobile-phone companies operated in
Britain using “second-generation” (2G) technology. The incumbents were Cellnet, One-2-
One, Orange, and Vodafone. (British Telecom (BT), the erstwhile state-owned monopolist
privatized under Mrs. Thatcher, held a 60% stake in Cellnet which it increased to 100% in
1999.) The proportion of the population using a portable phone was rising rapidly5 and,
as in other parts of the world, the cellular telephone industry was regarded as a runaway
success; the industry was set to become even more important with the introduction of the
“third generation” of portable telephones that would allow high-speed data access to the
internet.
1The exact total raised was £22,477.4 million (or about £22,477.3 million after deducting the cost of
the economic consultants–primarily on programming simulations, running experiments etc.).
2See Gibbon (1776). The German telecom auction subsequently raised even more in cash terms
(although less per head of population) and takeover battles often reduce to a kind of auction with even
higher prices
3The ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) successfully tendered to the
UK Radiocommuncations Agency for the contract. The other economists on the team were Tilman
Börgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel, and Joe Swierzbinski. The laboratory work was conducted by
Geoﬀ Miller, Chris Tomlinson, and John McCarthy.
4Readers seeking more detail should consult the British Radiocommunications Agency website
(www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk). Another useful source is the independent report of the National Au-
dit Oﬃce (2001) on the auction, available at www.nao.gov.uk. (The NAO is ‘totally independent of
Government’ but ‘report(s) to Parliament on the economy, eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness [of Government]
departments and other bodies’–see the NAO website.)
5The number of cellular mobile phones subscribers grew from 1 million to 10 million between 1992
and 1998, and leapt to 35 million - 60% of the population - by 2000, according to Oftel.
5How “third-generation” technology will work, and what the ﬁnal products of the in-
dustry will be, remains uncertain even today. In 1997, three years before the auction,
predictions were even more ﬂuid. This was of major importance in planning for the auc-
tion, because the engineering and the commercial advice received towards the end of the
planning period was very diﬀerent from the advice received at the beginning of the period.
It was therefore necessary to keep urging the importance of retailoring the auction design
to ﬁt the changing circumstances since, as we shall see, “one size ﬁts all” is a very bad
principle in auction design.
Economists had been advocating auctioning radiospectrum at least since Ronald Coase
(1959). William Vickrey, in particular, had been pushing the use of auctions in such
contexts for many years, but had been left to sing unheard for most of his career. However,
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) eventually turned to auctioning
radiospectrum for phone licences in 1994. The FCC used the “simultaneous ascending
auction” design that had ﬁrst been sketched by Vickrey (1976) and whose details were
independently developed by McAfee, Milgrom and Wilson. This auction is much like a
standard “ascending” auction used to sell a painting in Sotheby’s or Christies,6 except
that several objects are sold at the same time, with the price rising on each of them
independently, and none of the objects is ﬁnally sold until no-one wishes to bid again
on any of the objects.7 The FCC auctions worked fairly well in practice (McAfee and
MacMillan, 1996; Milgrom, forthcoming; Klemperer, 1998, 2000a, 2002b), and the fact
that $20 billion was raised in the initial series of auctions–twice the original estimate–
attracted much favourable media attention.
The U.K. embraced auctions later than the U.S., and the U.K.’s current “second-
generation” mobile-phone licences were awarded using a “beauty contest”, in which ﬁrms
submitted business plans to a government committee which awarded the licences to those
candidates it judged best met a set of published criteria. But by the late 1990s, economists’
arguments for the use of auctions were beginning to make headway in Britain.
2 Auctions vs Beauty Contests
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6In an ascending auction, the price starts low and competing bidders raise the price until no-one is
prepared to bid any higher, at which point the ﬁnal bidder then wins the prize at the ﬁnal price he bid.
7The design allows a bidder to switch his interest between objects as relative price levels change.
8This section is based on Klemperer (2000d).
62.1. Arguments for Auctions
Most importantly, a well-designed auction is the method most likely to allocate re-
sources to those who can use them most valuably.9 Rather than relying on government
bureaucrats to assess the merits of competing ﬁrms’ business plans, an auction forces
businessmen to put their “money where their mouths are” when they make their bids.
An auction can therefore extract and use information otherwise unavailable to the gov-
ernment.10
Secondly, the diﬃculty of specifying and evaluating criteria for a beauty contest11
makes this a time-consuming and opaque process that leads to political and legal contro-
versy, and the perception, if not the reality, of favouritism and corruption12 Indeed, some
governments make no secret of choosing beauty contests precisely because of the possibil-
ities for favouring their “national champions” over foreign ﬁrms. But such protectionism
is unlikely to beneﬁt consumers or taxpayers.
Thirdly, of course, an auction can raise staggering sums of money to support the public
ﬁnances–the U.K. auction yielded about 21
2% of GNP, or enough money to build 400
new hospitals. A beauty contest, by contrast, can give away valuable assets at a fraction
of what they are worth. The winners of the U.K.’s previous “second-generation” licences
made original payments in the region of just £40,000.13 Economists argued that those
9Allowing resale is not a perfect substitute for an eﬃcient initial allocation, because resale is itself
generally ineﬃcient (Cai, 1997; Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer,
1987). Milgrom (forthcoming, 2000) argues that the resale of phone licences has indeed been ineﬃcient
in the U.S. where it has been permitted.
10For example, we were advised during the auction development that one of the three smaller licences
sold was worth a little less than the other two. But the auction demonstrated otherwise. We have seen
exactly the same–ﬁrms ranking licences diﬀerently from government expectations–in other countries.
11Nicholas Negroponte (the technology guru who is one of the most prominent advocates of beauty
contests), for example, argues that 3G licences should be allocated to those who would guarantee the
lowest prices to consumers, invest the most in infrastructure, stimulate most creativity, etc. But how
can ﬁrms guarantee consumer prices for 5-20 years in the future for products that we may not yet even
be able to imagine? Infrastructure investment can be costed, but will it all be useful? How can the
government possibly decide who will be most creative? And how could the government monitor and
enforce any commitments made by ﬁrms? How should the government penalize a ﬁrm that turns out to
be insuﬃciently creative?, and what should the government’s response be to a ﬁrm that is creative and
develops a product with valuable unforeseen features but above the previously guaranteed price? It is
hard to think of a more serious drag on innovation than pre-specifying future prices for products that
don’t yet exist!
Note that we are not arguing that the government should not specify quality criteria for the licenses,
merely that these should be clearly thought out in advance (as, for example, was the UK government’s
requirement that 3G licensees roll out a network covering 80% of the UK population by 2007).
12The Spanish and Swedish 3G beauty contests, for example, provoked litigation and substantial and
still-continuing political debate. By contrast, several losing bidders complimented the U.K. on its auction
process.
13The operators also pay annual licence fees which had risen to £300,000 per MHz by 2000-01, or about
7who advocated beauty contests should say how they would prefer to fund the government.
Did they want higher income taxes?14
2.2. Popular Objections to Auctions
There are several common objections to auctions. They are said to be unfair to ﬁrms,
to raise consumer prices, and to reduce investment. But all of these complaints are based
on misperceptions.
First consider the argument that auctions are unfair to ﬁrms who are “forced to bid”.
It is true that incumbent mobile-phone operators might feel forced to win a new licence,
or see the value of their previous investments sharply reduced. But in no European 3G
auction have there been fewer licences than incumbents, and the prices of licences were
set by the marginal bidders who were therefore new entrants who had nothing to lose
if they failed to win a licence. And in the U.K., Germany, Italy and elsewhere, some
licences were won by companies who had no previous presence in those markets, further
proving that companies who were under no pressure to compete saw the risks as worth
taking.15 Of course, the companies are taking huge risks in bidding in an auction, just as,
for example, ﬁrms take huge risks when they invest in developing a new aircraft, a new
drug, or a Channel Tunnel. They know that they are buying into a lottery that might
result in huge losses or huge gains. Although 3G’s prospects look a lot less rosy a year
after the auction, and many people now believe that the winners of the British 3G auction
“paid too much”, only time will tell whether their gamble was a good one.16
Price Eﬀects
The most common fear about auctions seems to be that ﬁrms’ costs in an auction will
be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. This would be at least partly true
for an auction in which ﬁrms bid royalties (see Section 4.2). But the argument is generally
1% of the annual rental value of the spectrum implied by the UK third-generation auction prices.
14Martin Feldstein (1999) recently estimated that every extra $1 of income tax raised in the U.S. costs
the economy an additional $2 in deadweight losses caused through the disincentives to earn, and the
misallocation of resources to avoid taxes. True, Feldstein’s estimates may be overstated–33 cents in
deadweight loss would be a more typical estimate (see, e.g., Ballard et al, 1985)–but charging companies
for spectrum incurs none of these additional costs.
15Indeed in the U.K. case one winner quickly re-sold shares of its licence to two other new entrants at
a proﬁt!. See Section 7.1.
16It is because entrepreneurs take such risks that caution must be exercised in taxing away their proﬁts
when things turn out well.
8mistaken in an auction in which ﬁrms make once-and-for-all lump sum payments. Like
any other ﬁrms, telecom companies will charge the prices that maximise their proﬁts,
independently of what the spectrum cost them in the past.
One way to explain how sunk costs work to non-economists is to imagine we are now
in 2010 and the new cellular telephone services are being sold at whatever prices it turns
out maximise their proﬁts. If the government were suddenly to refund the licence fees
(with interest, so that it was as though the licences had initially been given away), how
would these prices change? Other things being equal, the prices would remain exactly the
same, because a company would be irrational to lower its price below what the market
will bear; the only result of the refund would be to increase the proﬁt of the shareholders
of the operating companies.
To take a more familiar example, consider housing prices. The price of new housing
is no lower when the developer had the good fortune to obtain the land below its current
market value (e.g. because it was obtained free through inheritance or was bought before
planning permission was available) than when the developer has paid the full market
value. In either case, the price is determined by the housing market at the time the new
housing is sold. There is no more sense in handing out free spectrum to the telecom
companies than in failing to charge developers for land in the belief that this will lead to
cheaper houses.
Of course, telecom companies (and land developers) have enormous incentives to argue
the opposite, because they obtain large windfall proﬁts if they can obtain a scarce resource
for free. And it is true that consumer prices can be aﬀected (even by past lump sum
payments). For example, paying auction fees could potentially create “focal points” that
allow ﬁrms to tacitly co-ordinate on charging higher prices. Paying auction fees also makes
ﬁrms poorer, so perhaps more willing to risk collusion, especially if they believe they are
too poor to aﬀord any ﬁnes. And an auction will, in principle, select those ﬁrms that are
better able to collude (hence are more proﬁtable). But all these eﬀects seem small, and
certainly avoidable with good competition policy.
Much more worrying is that companies’ specious arguments may fool politicians and
regulators into agreeing that the auction is a reason for allowing artiﬁcially high prices.17
If we do see higher prices in countries that ran auctions, it will probably be because of
these political eﬀects.
17There are some signs that this might happen in the U.K. and Germany. For example, Oftel (the
U.K.’s telecoms regulator) will be doing just this if it accepts operators’ arguments that it should permit
ﬁrms to set higher call-termination fees to “reﬂect” ﬁrms’ sunk auction costs.
9Investment Eﬀects
A ﬁnal concern is that large auction fees may slow investment because of capital-
market constraints. Of course this is theoretically possible,18 but it seems unlikely that
very many highly proﬁtable investments are being foregone because of diﬃculty raising
funding for them.19 Giving licences away to ﬁrms at discounted prices would certainly
relax ﬁrms’ capital-market constraints, just as any other state handouts would. There may
perhaps be good grounds for subsidising this industry, but advocates of giveaways need
to explain quite a lot: Why subsidise this industry rather than others? Why subsidise the
mobile-phone operators (rather than, for example, providers of content to be transmitted
over the mobile-phone networks)? Why subsidise them to this extent?
Furthermore, even a government that accepted (as the British government did not)
that auctions would slow investment (or raise prices to consumers) might ﬁnd it in its
own national interest to run an auction, because the auction revenues accrue only to
the country itself while any investment eﬀects apply to other countries too–the fact
that Telefonica’s consortium spent over $7 billion on a licence in Germany and almost
nothing on its Spanish licence is obviously not an argument for Telefonica to invest less
in Germany than in Spain.20 (In fact some commentators have suggested the opposite,
arguing that internal-organisational incentives will drive ﬁrms to launch their services
faster in Germany to demonstrate that they can quickly recoup their auction costs.21)
attn Printer: leave small gap here
Occasionally–for example, when there are too few potential bidders, or large costs
of supplying necessary information to bidders–a form of structured negotiations may be
18For example, the “pecking order” theory of funding suggests that depleting a ﬁrm’s cash by upfront
payments raises the ﬁrm’s cost of capital, and the ﬁnance literature is replete with examples where capital
structure matters for ﬁrm eﬃciency, see, e.g. Wruck (1994).
19In fact, by summer 2001, at least four of the ﬁve winners of the U.K. 3G licences, including the new
entrant, had arranged the necessary funding for their new U.K. networks.
20The Spanish government may have noticed this. It is belatedly trying to levy large fees on the
winners of its beauty contest.
21Indeed two of the winners of the U.K. licences have said that the high price they paid for the licences
in the auction encouraged them to develop 3G services faster than if the spectrum had been given away.
10better.22 However the general rule is that auctions treat ﬁrms fairly and transparently,
and yield the greatest possible beneﬁts for consumers and taxpayers.
In the autumn of 1997 therefore, the U.K. government asked us to help design a 3G
auction.
3 Aims of the Auction
Unlike some governments, the British were honest in pursuing their published aims. An
originally fuzzy set of aspirations, reﬂecting various diﬀerent interests and constrained by
European Commission directives, were gradually reﬁned into the following set of objec-
tives:
• To assign the spectrum eﬃciently;
• To promote competition;
• To “realise the full economic value” (subject to the other objectives).23
In the event, the competition aim was addressed by permitting no bidder to hold more
than one licence, and auctioning the maximum number of licences given the available
spectrum and the need to make them large enough for viable businesses.
As for the other objectives, our clear instructions were that eﬃciency considerations
were to take priority over revenue considerations.
Eﬃciency was understood as putting the licences into the hands of the bidders with
the best business plans. Since a bidder with a better business plan will generally value a
licence more,24 this aim roughly reduces to seeking to maximise the sum of the valuations
of the bidders who are awarded licences.25
22See Bulow and Klemperer (1996).
23In a written answer to a Parliamentary Question, Barbara Roche, then Minister for Small Firms,
Trade and Industry, said “In oﬀering through an auction licences to use speciﬁed frequencies for the
delivery of UMTS, the Government’s overall aim is to secure, for the long term beneﬁt of UK consumers
and the national economy, the timely and economically advantageous development and sustained provision
of UMTS services in the UK. Subject to this overall aim the Government’s objectives are to (i) utilise the
available UMTS spectrum with optimum eﬃciency; (ii) promote eﬀective and sustainable competition
for the provision of UMTS services; and (iii) subject to the above objectives, design an auction which is
best judged to realise the full economic value to consumers, industry and the taxpayer of the spectrum.”
See Hansard, 18 May 1998.
24Of course, there are reasons why this need not be true.
25Note that the government was unwilling to permit resale (see Section 4.1), but resale cannot in
any case be guaranteed to achieve eﬃciency (see note 9). Note also that while some commentators
have argued that more spectrum should have been sold oﬀ, that possibility was beyond our control: the
amount of spectrum to be used for 3G licences had been pre-determined by international treaty.
11But how does one ﬁnd out the bidders’ valuations? There is no point in simply asking
the bidders. If asked, each bidder will earnestly insist that his value is the highest. An
auction gets around this problem by making bidders back their plans with their money.
So promoting eﬃciency necessarily involves raising revenue which, happily, ﬁts with the
government’s last objective of “realising economic value”.
In view of the £22.48 billion that the auction raised, the media expressed profound
scepticism about revenue being genuinely last on the list of priorities, but the British gov-
ernment could obviously have made substantially more money by selling fewer licences.26
How much money it would have made by creating a monopoly by selling just one licence
beggars the imagination!
4M a i n I s s u e s
Our ﬁrst task was to assess the economic and legal environment in which the auction would
take place, and oﬀer a menu of auction designs from which the Radiocommuncations
Agency could make an initial choice.
4.1. The Problem ofEntry
We felt strongly that questions of market structure were substantially more important
than the informational issues on which orthodox auction theory focuses.27 Events were
to show that we were even more right in this judgement than we knew.
The essential structural problem in auctioning 3G telecom licences is that the incum-
bents who are already operating in the 2G telecom industry enjoy a major advantage over
potential new entrants, so it may be hard to persuade potential entrants to bid. Not only
are the incumbents’ 2G businesses complementary to 3G, but their costs of rolling out
the infrastructure (radio masts and the like) necessary to operate a 3G industry are very
substantially less than those of a new entrant, because they can piggyback on their 2G
infrastructure.28 Incumbents also have the advantage of established customer bases and
brand-name recognition. These considerations loomed even larger in the early planning
26Not only would reducing the number of licences reduce competition in 3G services and so increase
the total proﬁts in the industry, but reducing below four licences would exclude an incumbent operator.
27Jehiel and Moldovanu’s (1996) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti’s (1996) work on “externalities”
was a notable exception, as is Jehiel and Moldovanu’s (2001) recent model concerning market structure
considerations inspired by the 3G auctions. See Klemperer (1999, 2000b) for summaries of the extensive
auctions literature.
28Furthermore, there is the possibility that the regulations might in some circumstances be altered so
that the spectrum licensed for 2G purposes can be “refarmed” for 3G purposes (though the Government
made clear that no commitments could be made on how and when refarming would be implemented).
12stages, because market research indicated that the more obvious potential entrants were
not yet showing any great interest in the coming British 3G industry, and so there were
no good reasons for being optimistic about entry to the auction.
Our initial report therefore emphasized the importance of encouraging entry to the
auction in pursuit of the aim of promoting competition. Two of the measures we suggested,
allowing resale and making bidding credits available to the entrants, were ruled out for
various reasons. But we were successful in advocating that the government mandate
“roaming”, which would allow an entrant access to the incumbents’ 2G network at a
regulated price.29
4.2. Royalties or Lump Sum Payments?
Payment for licences using a royalty rather than a lump-sum fee is another way of
promoting entry, both because it allows the government to share the risk with an operator,
and because new entrants are likely to make smaller payments for any given royalty rate,
but we were unenthusiastic about using royalties. They must necessarily be levied on
some genuinely observable variable, which proﬁt is not. So they are usually based on
some correlate of revenue. For example, in some American oil-tract auctions, the royalty
is based on an independent metering of the oil pumped to the well-head, valued at that
day’s market price.
However, a royalty based on revenue corresponds to a “value added tax” and so creates
deadweight losses in an oligopolistic industry such as telecoms, for exactly the same reason
that a sales tax makes a monopoly or oligopoly worse. Moreover, a royalty of the form
x cents per phone call corresponds to a speciﬁc tax and is even more distortionary.30 By
contrast oil has, roughly speaking, a “world price” that is largely unaﬀected by any one
country levying a royalty.
Royalty payments also allow bidders to default, or to attempt renegotiation if opti-
mistic predictions of demand turn out to be mistaken. One therefore faces the risk that a
buyer may treat his purchase only as an “option to buy”. Many of the U.S. spectrum auc-
tions suﬀered from this kind of behaviour–winners were not required to make payments
upfront and some simply never paid–which caused the FCC administrative diﬃculty and
29See Section 6.1. We were of course not alone in our concern to attract entry. Advice from Oftel
and N. M. Rothschild and Sons Ltd. was also important.
30To see that a proportional tax (or royalty) on revenue is less distortionary than a per-unit (speciﬁc)
tax, observe that the former corresponds to the sum of (i) a non-distortionary proportional tax on proﬁts
(= revenues - costs) plus (ii) a distortionary proportional tax on costs. For a given amount of tax raised,
this is less distortionary than a per-unit tax. See Bulow and Klemperer (1998) for further discussion.
13political embarrassment.
All these problems arise when royalties are pre-set by the government. If ﬁrms bid
royalties, the problems are even worse: the US Department of the Interior ran a very
unsuccessful experiment with royalty-based auctions for oil-tracts about 20 years ago,
in which the government ﬁxed a relatively small up-front “bonus” payment, and the
companies bid percentages of their revenues. The result was that many speculators bid
enormous royalty rates in order to win licences. If the oil-ﬁelds turned out to be highly
productive they could make money even at the high royalty rates, but most ﬁelds were
simply not developed, even when it was economically eﬃcient to do so. (For example, a
winner paying an 80 percent royalty would develop a ﬁeld only if it yielded a return more
than ﬁve times the production cost.)
And, of course, further distortions would be created in an oligopolistic market like
telecoms if diﬀerent winners paid diﬀerent royalty rates.
In spite of these problems, we considered schemes in which payment would involve both
royalties and a lump-sum fee. However, such schemes were ruled out by various technical
and other considerations and given a straight choice between royalties and lump-sum fees
it was clearly right to recommend the latter. Although economically eﬃcient, this choice
attracted considerable criticism from commentators unable to distinguish between the
impact of a sunk cost and a variable cost on pricing decisions (see Section 2).31
4.3. How Many Licences?
We were also anxious that engineering concerns about the higher quality of service
made possible by issuing large licences should be properly balanced by an appreciation of
the beneﬁts to consumers of the increased competition made possible by issuing a larger
number of smaller licences.
Many oﬃcials are attracted by the idea pushed by incumbent ﬁrms that the “market”
should decide how many licences there should be. But this confuses two diﬀerent markets;
the interests of the consumers who participate in the phone market created by the auction
are not represented in the auction “market” for licences. We considered a number
of possible designs in which the number and size of the licences would be determined
endogenously in the auction, but advised that an eﬃcient allocation of licences across
31With some honorable exceptions, much of the media seemed very slow in catching on to the sig-
niﬁcance of the auction, and singularly ill-informed on economic realities when they did. This was
disappointing, since although we personally were not allowed to talk to the media about events in the
auction while it was going on, the government put extensive eﬀort into media brieﬁng.
14bidders could not be guaranteed, and that only unacceptably complex designs would
provide reasonable protection against the emergence of an anticompetitive industry.32
So in the end the U.K. government chose to auction a ﬁxed number of licences, per-
mitting no bidder to win more than one licence.
4.4. Legal Issues
On several occasions we had to get involved with the legal ﬁne print.
We had to argue more than once that bids must be binding. Permitting bidders to
withdraw them later would have reduced the bids to cheaptalk and made a mockery of
the process.
We also had to insist that any reserve price should be a clear commitment not to
sell if the bidding did not meet the price. If bidders expected that the government
would immediately turn around and re-auction any unsold licence at a lower price, then
the reserve prices would have no meaning. We won this point in the end, but reserve
prices actually played little role in the auction because the information available to the
government was limited so it was appropriate to set reserves very cautiously.33
Awkwardness in the wording of the relevant Telecommunication Act required us to
develop special implementations of some of the auction formats we were proposing. While
we could always ﬁnd an implementation of our ideas that circumvented the problems,
considerable care was sometimes required. Changing the wording of the Act would have
risked delaying the auction and was probably not politically viable.
It would be easy to underestimate the diﬃculty of ensuring that the small print does
not somehow undermine the principles of an auction design.
5 Auction Designs
5.1. The Anglo-Dutch Design
Our preliminary analysis considered the implications of various diﬀerent numbers of
licences being put up for sale. The worst case for the success of an auction was that only
32We also wanted to avoid any risk of a “sorry winner” who bid rationally to maximise expected proﬁt
but ended up losing money because of the particular behaviour of other bidders. (See Pagnozzi, 2002).
Such a sorry winner may litigate, or default, and so embarrass the government. For example, the German
and Austrian 3G auctions, which determined the number of licences within the auction, ran the risk of
creating sorry winners, even though this turned out not to be the biggest problem of these auctions. See
Klemperer (2002a, b).
33Reserve prices should have played a larger role in the subsequent European 3G auctions (see Section
7.3).
15four licences would be available–one for each of the four 2G incumbents. Given that the
incumbents would be bidding from an advantaged position, why would a potential new
entrant spend any money preparing to bid in an auction?
So when it seemed that engineering considerations made it impossible to provide more
than four licences, each of roughly equal size, we felt that our major problem was to
promote entry to the auction. The design of the auction could not be expected to have
the same sort of eﬀect on entry as matters like the provision of roaming rights, but we
nevertheless thought it important to do what could be done.
Where entry is a concern, an ascending-price auction is not ideal. An example of the
problem was the sale of the Los Angeles licence in the big American telecom auction
run by the FCC. The licence was acquired cheaply by the incumbent, Paciﬁc Bell, which
faced little risk in implementing its widely advertised strategy of not being beaten in Los
Angeles. All it had to do was to persistently make the minimum overbid if an entrant
challenged, until the entrant gave up the hopeless struggle (Klemperer, 1998). Under
these circumstances, the FCC were lucky that Paciﬁc Bell faced any challenge at all.34
For similar reasons, some recent ascending-price telecoms auctions, notably the Swiss 3G
auction, have been ﬁascos in which there were no more bidders than licences (Klemperer,
2002a, b).35
Sealed-bid auctions do better at promoting entry because they give entrants a better
chance of winning against strong incumbents (Klemperer, 2002b). However, sealed-bid
auctions do not allow bidders to gather information on the business plans of their rivals
by observing who is staying in and who is getting out as the price rises. They therefore
make it impossible for bidders to reﬁne their valuations of the licences on the basis of
this information. In an attempt to capture the desirable features of both auction types,
we proposed what we called an Anglo-Dutch design.36
In an Anglo-Dutch auction for one object, the price rises until all but two bidders quit
and the last two bidders then make “best and ﬁnal” sealed bids with the winner paying
the price he bid in this ﬁnal round. So an Anglo-Dutch auction resembles the process
by which houses are sometimes sold; the fact that we could describe it in terms of this
34The activity rules for the auction meant that some bidders placed (low) bids on licences they had no
expectations of winning in order to maintain eligibility to win other licences later in the auction.
35See also Bulow and Klemperer (2002); Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999); Gilbert and Klemperer
(2000); and Klemperer and Pagnozzi (2002).
36A Dutch auction is equivalent to a ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction. An English auction is the prototype
of an ascending-price auction. The Anglo-Dutch auction was ﬁrst proposed and described in Klemperer
(1998).
16very familiar institution was important for our ability to sell the proposal to government
oﬃcials, who in turn had to explain the proposal to their political masters.
In our case we had four licences to sell, so the price would rise until only ﬁve bidders
remained. The surviving bidders would then be committed to bid at or above this price
in a sealed-bid auction in which the four highest bidders are awarded a licence.
We considered two versions of the Anglo-Dutch; one in which each winner is committed
to paying his own bid, and one in which each winner is committed to paying the fourth-
highest winning bid. The prospective bidders preferred the latter design, as did we.37
Finally, although the four licences that were to be oﬀered were close substitutes, they
were not suﬃciently similar that they could be assigned arbitrarily. A third stage, modeled
on the standard simultaneous ascending design used by the U.S. FCC, was therefore
introduced to determine who got which licence and at what price.
Since the three stages of an Anglo-Dutch auction are quite complicated, we thought it
especially important to test its eﬃciency in the laboratory. The short deadlines with which
one is typically faced in consulting work are particularly troublesome in experimental
work, since one is left with very little time to sort out the teething problems that always
turn up after running a few pilots. In this case, the original pilots seemed to indicate that
the design was hopelessly ineﬃcient. However, the amount that subjects are paid for their
time and attention can sometimes be critical in laboratory experiments, and so it proved
here. Subjects were paid a ﬂat attendance fee and an amount proportional to the proﬁt
they made for the company on whose behalf they were told they were bidding. After
doubling the latter rate of payment (so that subjects left with an average of £50 ($70)),
the experimental results became close to eﬃcient. We used two rough-and-ready criteria
to judge eﬃciency in a variety of scenarios about relative valuations that market research
rendered plausible. In terms of money, we found that the sum of the valuations of the
allocated licences was always within 2 or 3 percent of the theoretical maximum. In terms
of an ordering of all possible allocations of the licences, the experimental allocation usually
achieved the social optimum, sometimes achieved the second most eﬃcient allocation, and
37The latter (uniform-price) design is likely to be more eﬃcient given the need for the third,
simultaneous-ascending, stage discussed in the next paragraph.
If desired, it can be run without revealing the winners’ bids by isolating the ﬁve bidders from each
other and running an ascending auction, keeping the ﬁrst quit secret from the other bidders, stopping the
auction only when the second quit is announced to the auctioneer, and then selling to the four winners
(including the second quitter) at the ﬁnal price. From the bidders’ point of view this procedure is
equivalent to a uniform-price sealed-bid auction, that is, the second quit-price in this procedure would
equal the fourth-highest sealed-bid price.
17was only occasionally worse.38
The Radiocommunications Agency therefore bravely decided to go ahead with the
proposed Anglo-Dutch design, in spite of ﬁerce criticism from the incumbents, who could
not be expected to welcome a design intended to promote entry.39 We think that their ex-
perience in playing the roles of bidders within our experimental software had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect in bolstering the conﬁdence of noneconomists on the auction team in the workability
of the design. (By contrast, mathematical equations have very little persuasive power.)
However, all the work developing and testing the Anglo-Dutch design proved unneces-
sary when the engineering advice changed and we were informed that it would be possible
to make ﬁve licences available instead of four.
5.2. The Simultaneous Ascending Design
The ﬁve licences that we were now advised could be ﬁtted into the available spectrum
were of diﬀerent sizes (because of the need to observe the international UMTS standard
for third-generation mobile that required spectrum to be bundled in 5 MHz chunks).
Some licences would therefore be valued very diﬀerently from others by the bidders in
an auction. Licence A is the largest, comprising 2x15MHz of paired spectrum plus 5MHz
of less-valuable unpaired spectrum. Licence B is a little smaller, comprising 2x15MHz
of paired spectrum, but no unpaired spectrum. Licences C, D and E are all roughly the
same, each comprising 2x10MHz of paired plus 5MHz of unpaired spectrum, but these
three licences were thought substantially less valuable than the other two.40
The existence of ﬁve licences solved the overall entry problem, especially when it
was decided to restrict the incumbents in the 2G industry to licences B, C, D and E,
so ensuring that one of the two large licences would go to a new entrant. (There was
concern about whether new entrants would be interested in the smaller licences.) The
raison d’etre for the Anglo-Dutch design therefore vanished. Furthermore, it might not
have worked as well for licences of very diﬀerent sizes as it would have worked when the
licences were of very similar values.
38A bidder commissioned experiments (Abbink et al, 2001) that found that the Anglo-Dutch design
did not necessarily promote more entry than does a uniform price auction, but the setting it tested was
one in which (unlike ours) entry is relatively easy in either case.
39One major bidder employed two Nobel prizewinners in the hope of ﬁnding arguments to oppose the
design.
40With six licenses, there was thought to be a substantial risk that no license would be large enough
to attract an entrant.
Each license was to last until the end of 2021, and included an obligation to roll out a network covering
at least 80% of the UK population by 2007.
18So with ﬁve licences and only four incumbents, we advised abandoning the Anglo-
Dutch design in favour of a modiﬁed version of the simultaneous ascending design pio-
neered by the FCC. We believed that the design would work even better for us, since the
fact that each bidder was restricted to getting at most one licence insulated us against
the problems with collusion that arose in America.41
Our design entailed multiple rounds of simultaneous bids. In the ﬁrst round, each
bidder makes a bid on one licence of its own choice. To remain in the auction, a bidder
must be ‘active’ in every subsequent round. An active bidder either currently holds the
top bid on a particular licence, or else raises the bid on a licence of the bidder’s choice by
at least the minimum bid increment.42 A bidder who is inactive in any round is eliminated
from the rest of the auction. A bidder who currently holds the top bid on a licence cannot
raise or withdraw its bid, nor bid on another licence in the current round. At the end
of every round all bidders’ bids are revealed, the current top bidder for each licence
is determined,43 and minimum bid increments are set for the next round. The auction
concludes when only ﬁve bidders remain. They are each then allocated the licence on
which they are the current top bidder at the price they have currently bid for that licence.
This design ensured that even if new entrants had only been interested in the two large
licences, the competition for these would have spilt over to the smaller licences too. The
incumbents would engage in arbitrage, switching their bids to whichever licence seemed
best value to them, so as the prices of the large licences were driven up, the prices of the
smaller ones would have had to follow, and the price of every licence would have been
determined by real competition.
Apart from its transparency, and from generating competitive prices, the design has
two important advantages, which we explain on the assumption that the minimum raise
is always negligible. The ﬁrst is the simplicity of bidders’ strategies. Consider the case of
“private values”, that is, when every bidder is completely conﬁdent of the exact value to
41I ft h es p e c t r u mw a sd i v i d e di n t om a n ys m a l lb l o c k s ,w i t hb i d d e r sa l l o w e dt ow i nm u l t i p l eb l o c k s ,
bidders might try to collude to divide the blocks between them; roughly this seems to have happened in
some of the U.S. auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Brusco and Lopomo, 1999; Cramton
and Schwartz, 1999, 2000; Klemperer, 2002b). If bidders can win just one licence each, every bidder is
either a winner or a loser–there is no middle ground–and collusion is much harder.
42A bidder could also remain “active” by using one of three waivers allowed per bidder or, when eight
or fewer bidders remained, by calling for one of two recesses allowed per bidder. Each recess would stop
all bidding for a day.
43In the event of a tie on a licence the “top bidder” for that licence was designated randomly. (The
rules allowed the auctioneer to instead ask the tied bidders to each rebid at least as high on the licence
in question, and the intention was as far as possible to use whatever tiebreaking rule made the bidders
happiest. In the event, the bidders proved to be as unconcerned as we were about this detail.)
19himself of each object, and these values are independent of who wins the other objects and
at what prices. Assume bidding is costless, and that at every point of time every bidder
assigns a positive probability (which may be arbitrarily small) to the possibility that each
rival will be willing to make no further bid, so each bid may possibly be the last one.44
In each round, a bidder should then simply make the bid that would maximise his proﬁt
if that bid were the last. A bidder should therefore never make more than the minimum
raise, and always choose the licence with the greatest gap between the minimum required
bid and his value for the licence. In the general case, relaxing the assumption of “private-
values”, things are a little harder; in particular, a bidder must adjust his valuations for
the licences if the previous bidding of his rivals shakes his conﬁdence in his business case
but, having done that, bidding as described previously is still a reasonable strategy to
recommend.45
A second advantage is that the design generates an eﬃcient outcome when bidders
with “private values” who are not budget constrained behave as described above. To see
why, note that at the end of the auction the prices are such that every bidder, including
every loser, would choose to buy exactly what he ends up with, given the prices. Therefore
no reallocation of licences among bidders, given the prices, could raise the surplus of any
individual bidder. So since prices are just a transfer between the buyers and the seller,
the total surplus of the buyers and the seller cannot be increased by ﬁrst reallocating the
licences in any way and then changing the prices in any way. So even if diﬀerent prices
were used the auction’s outcome must maximise the sum of the values of the winning
bidders, which is what we understood by “eﬃciency” (see Section 3).46
Of course, these advantages need not apply under other assumptions, in particular the
case in which a bidder may quit early or fail to enter the auction because bidding is not
costless and he believes he has very little chance of winning a licence. So only when a
ﬁfth licence was available to attract new entrants did we feel comfortable recommending
the simultaneous ascending design.
In early 1999 the decision was made to proceed with the simultaneous ascending design.
44These assumptions exclude the case in which a bidder quits before reaching his value for a license (or
even fails to enter the auction) because he knows he cannot win the license.
45The precise conditions under which such bidding behaviour is optimal remain a subject for debate
among both theorists and practitioners.
46To illustrate the point mathematically, imagine that an auction for only two licences ends with bidder
1 obtaining licence A for £a and bidder 2 obtaining licence Bfor £b. Using Greek letters for bidders’
valuations and assuming the minimum allowable raise is negligible, we have that α1 − a ≥ β1 − b and
β2 −b ≥ α2 −a. Adding the two inequalities yields α1 +β2 ≥ α2 +β1. The outcome is therefore eﬃcient
insofar as the winners are concerned. It is obviously also eﬃcient in respect of losers, because losers’
valuations cannot be above a and b, and hence must be lower than winners’ valuations.
206 Other Issues
6.1. Roaming
At a late stage, One-2-One and Orange mounted a successful legal challenge against
mandated “roaming”, throwing our plans into disarray since it was unclear whether any
entrants would bid without guaranteed roaming onto an existing 2G network.
However, new entrants needed only one incumbent network to roam on, and one
incumbent was prepared to oﬀer roaming, conditional on itself winning a 3G licence. So
new entrants would be prepared to bid if they were permitted to withdraw any winning
bids in the event that this incumbent failed to win, with the government then re-auctioning
the corresponding licences in this event.
The diﬃculty was that this incumbent might then strategically avoid winning, delib-
erately triggering the withdrawal of the winning entrants so that it could win a cheap
licence in the re-auction. We overcame this danger by inserting an extra stage into the
game. If this incumbent failed to win a licence, the other 2G incumbents would then
be asked whether they were now, after all, prepared to permit roaming. If any of them
were, the auction result would stand. The point is that the other incumbents would likely
see this as an unmissable opportunity to exclude a strong competitor from 3G. And the
ﬁrst incumbent would therefore be most unlikely to run the risk of strategically avoiding
winning in the original auction.
In the end, two incumbents, BT and Vodafone agreed to oﬀer roaming voluntarily, so
this scheme was not needed.47
6.2. Associated Bidders
The European telecom industry is rather incestuous, with potentially many pairs of
“associated bidders” whose ownership is suﬃciently shared that both could not be allowed
to win licences without damaging the competitiveness of the U.K. 3G market we were
creating. For example, Cellnet was jointly owned by BT and Securicor at the time, so not
more than one these three ﬁrms could be permitted to win. We saw no very satisfactory
way of modifying the auction rules to guarantee that only one of any associated pair won
a licence. Instead, therefore, we made provision for a pre-auction in which it could be
decided which of two or more closely associated bidders should go forward to the main
47Furthermore, the Court judgement in favour of One-2-One and Orange was subsequently overturned
on appeal in favour of the government.
21auction.48
As we hoped, the pre-auction was not used in practice. We saw the pre-auction as
a stopgap measure designed to provide a clear status quo for the bargaining between
associated bidders when they sort out their cross-ownership problems themselves. The
pre-auction would also have disadvantaged associated bidders relative to the other bidders,
so gave them an incentive to sort out their common ownership problem in advance of the
auction. In the event, BT bought out Securicor’s share of Cellnet in July 1999 and then
bid only as BT3G, thereby resolving the most pressing association problem.
We do not believe that actually running pre-auctions of this kind is a good way of
solving problems with associated bidders, even though it might make the best of a bad
job. So we hope that such pre-auctions will not be seen as a standard preliminary to
a telecom auction. When associations begin to be even a little bit complex, there is no
guarantee that their outcomes will be eﬃcient.
In our case, the pre-auction fulﬁlled its function by providing some encouragement for
the bidders to work out their problems themselves.
6.3. The Vodafone-Mannesmann Takeover
In October 1999, one of Germany’s two largest mobile-phone operators, Mannesmann,
took over Orange for almost $35 billion. This left Vodafone in a quandary, since it
had been contemplating an alliance with Mannesmann, but this was no longer possible
as Orange was one of its strongest 2G competitors in the U.K. In the event, Vodafone
decided to attempt the biggest takeover ever, and the ﬁrst hostile takeover in modern
history of a German company, by making a bid for Mannesmann-Orange. Vodafone
simultaneously appealed that both Orange and Vodafone should be allowed to bid in the
British 3G auction if the takeover were successful, pending the divestment of Orange after
the auction.
This appeal left the British government in a diﬃcult position.
48The pre-auction would have consisted of every associated bidder bidding in an ascending auction on
a price per MHz basis until it either quit, or all those associated with it had quit. Once all associations
had been broken, bidders who had quit would have been considered for re-entry in the reverse order in
which they quit; each bidder who had quit would have been re-entered at the price at which it had quit
if this was possible without recreating any association. Finally, each survivor would have been required
to begin the main auction with a bid at the price per MHz at which it become unassociated, or at which
it rejoined the pre-auction. Of course, these rules are very rough and ready, and we did not expect them
to be needed in practice.
22The situation was not an ordinary “associated bidders” problem since Vodafone was
committed to divesting Orange, so allowing both to win licences caused no competition-
policy problems, and indeed would very likely be eﬃcient. And (by contrast with BT-
Cellnet-Securicor) the common-ownership problem could not necessarily be quickly re-
solved, because complex provisions of German law meant that Vodafone could not guar-
antee divesting Orange until several months after the conclusion of a successful takeover
of Mannesmann.
Denying the appeal and proceeding with the 3G auction could seriously interfere with
Vodafone’s chances of success in its takeover bid. Even if Vodafone did, nevertheless,
successfully take over Mannesmann-Orange, denying one or both of Vodafone and Or-
ange the chance to compete in the auction would have seriously damaged the excluded
business(es), and most likely have generated an ineﬃcient allocation of licences.
One option was to delay the auction, but this would have risked creating market
uncertainty and delaying the introduction of 3G. The auction team was also very keen
to maintain the advantage of being the ﬁrst of the 3G auctions. We thought subsequent
3G auctions might attract less entry since bidders would work out from the ﬁrst auction
who the likely winners were in future auctions. The later auctions would also be less
competitive if bidders formed more alliances. Furthermore prices in the ﬁrst auction might
be driven higher if bidders thought that winning that auction gave them a competitive
advantage in future auctions. The decision not to delay proved very wise. There was in
fact much less entry and competition in later 3G auctions (Netherlands, Germany, Italy,
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Denmark) and much lower prices in most of them
(see section 7.3, and Klemperer, 2002a).
In deciding whether to grant the appeal, a major concern for the British government
was the extent to which joint ownership of Orange and Vodafone would injure the aim of
allocating the licences eﬃciently, if both were allowed to bid with appropriate “chinese
wall” requirements, forbidding the exchange of relevant information and the coordination
of bids. The point is that Vodafone, as temporary owner of Orange, would have an
interest in maximizing the sum of Vodafone and Orange’s proﬁt in the auction, rather
than simply maximizing its own proﬁt. Advising on the eﬃciency implications of this at
short notice was the most stressful event in the whole auction design process. However,
some simple theoretical calculations and our computer simulations both indicated that,
within the range of likely relative valuations of the licences, the eﬀect on eﬃciency would
be negligibly small.
23Since it was a ﬁnely balanced decision whether to permit both Orange and Vodafone to
bid in the British 3G auction if Vodafone’s takeover of Mannesmann were successful, our
report may have tipped the scales in favour of both being allowed to bid with appropriate
legal safeguards. In the event, Vodafone took over Mannesmann for about $175 billion.
There is no evidence that this led to any ineﬃciency in the auction bidding. After the
auction, Orange was bought by France Telecom for over $40 billion.
7Assessment
7.1. The Auction Outcome
Beginning the planning so far in advance of the auction (almost three years in advance
as it turned out) proved a shrewd move by the U.K. government. It allowed us plenty
of time to develop and test our ideas and, just as importantly, it allowed for a sustained
marketing campaign49 without Britain being overtaken in the race to be ﬁrst on the
European scene (indeed worldwide) with a 3G auction.
By 15 February, 2000, interest in acquiring a licence had reached boiling point. Thir-
teen serious candidates had qualiﬁed to bid in the auction, with the media that took
notice predicting that licences would sell for a total of about £2-5 billion (or about $3-
71
2 billion). The ﬁrst round of the auction took place on 6 March, 2000, when a little
more than the sum of the reserve prices, £500 million ($750 million), was bid. The ﬁrst
withdrawal came in round 94 as the price of the cheapest licence passed £2 billion ($3
billion), and four more withdrawals followed almost immediately.50 However the last three
withdrawals took longer. The ﬁnal bid took the cheapest licence price past £4 billion
($6 billion), and after 150 rounds of bidding the auction ﬁnished on 27 April, 2000 with a
total of about £221
2 billion ($34 billion) on the table–ﬁve to ten times the initial media
estimates.51
The four incumbents won licences, with Vodafone paying about £6 billion ($9 billion)
for licence B, compared with the £4 billion ($6 billion) or so paid by the other incumbents
49The investment bankers advising the government (N.M. Rothschild and Sons Ltd.) were paid a fee
that depended on the number of bidders who participated in the auction. By attracting 13 bidders,
Rothschilds earned £4,770,000, or over forty times the total expenditure on economic consultancy (see
note 1).
50The rush of dropouts can be interpreted either as agreement among this group of bidders about the
values, or as agency problems that meant that no management wished to be seen to be the ﬁrst to quit.
The former seems to be the case: it became known afterwards that several bidders had secured funding
up to £2 billion.
51The British Treasury used the money towards paying oﬀ the National Debt.
24for each of licences C, D and E. The reserved licence A was taken by the entrant TIW
(largely owned by Hutchison Whampoa) for about £4.4 billion ($6.6 billion).
The ﬁnal outcome cannot, of course, be proved to be eﬃcient, but the evidence strongly
suggests it was, in the sense of maximising the sum of the valuations of the bidders who
were awarded licences, given the number and sizes of licences that were sold (see Section
3). See Börgers and Dustmann (2001) and Plott and Salmon (2001) for detailed analyses
of the bidding.52
While the auction proceeded, our chief task was to advise on the size of the minimum
percentage raise, which fell gradually from 5% to 1.5% largely in response to bidders’
preferences. We also urged with only limited success that the auction be speeded up by
running more rounds per day, lest some external event derailed the process by leading
the bidders to adjust their valuations downwards. In fact, there was a major dip in
share prices during the auction as the market corrected for over-optimistic investment in
e-commerce companies, but this event seems to have had little impact on the bidders.
The arrangements for waivers and recess days (to allow consultation with ﬁnancial
backers) seemed to work out well, and the auction process was suﬃciently well organized
as to provoke compliments from several bidders, including those who did not win licences.
However, media criticism began immediately about the bidders being “forced” to pay
too much for their licences (see Section 2). But Hutchison sold 35% of its holding in
TIW to KPN and NTT DoCoMo, valuing the licence it won for £4.4 billion in late April
at about £6 billion in early July. Moreover, after Orange had won and committed to
pay for a licence, France Telecom paid £6 billion more for Orange in May than the price
52Bidders did not follow the simple bidding rule discussed in Section 5.2 of always making the minimum
raise possible on the licence on which they bid (Börgers and Dustmann, 2001). However, the deviations
were not substantial and some deviations from this rule are optimal for a bidder and so to be expected
when the minimum allowable raises are not negligible. Börgers and Dustmann also argue BT’s bidding
seems erratic, although it might be largely explained by common-value components to valuations and by
BT wishing to push up the price Vodafone paid for a large licence.
Furthermore, in the early stages of the contest, when it was clear that there was no realistic chance
of the auction ending very quickly (even up to round 120, eight bidders still remained in the auction),
some bids were probably slightly frivolous, or designed to attract media attention. For example, One-
2-One raised their bid by slightly more than the minimum required in round 76 to bid £1,212,100,000!
(Additional 1’s and 2’s were ruled out, because all bids were required to be multiples of £100,000.)
While Börgers and Dustmann’s analysis makes clear that the behaviour they document means that
the auction ran the risk of a slightly ineﬃcient conclusion, it also seems clear that the actual outcome
was eﬃcient or very close to eﬃcient in the sense of Section 3. (It seems clear after the fact–and after
the other European auctions–that the four incumbents had the highest valuations, so were appropriate
winners in the sense of Section 3, and it is extremely implausible that any losing entrant quit the auction
with a value for a licence that exceeded TIW’s. Furthermore, the evidence both during and subsequent
to the auction suggests Vodafone had a higher incremental value for a large licence than did any other
incumbent, and therefore that the allocation of licences among winners was also correct.)
25Mannesmann had paid for it in the previous October, before the auction. Neither event
suggests that the ﬁrms or the market shared the concerns expressed by the media in the
months immediately following the auction.53
Of course, conﬁdence in hi-tech industries in general has waned since that time. But
the auction design deserves neither praise nor blame if the values placed on the 3G licences
have now fallen because of a change in the capital market’s view of 3G’s prospects.
7.2. Mistakes
What could have been done better in organizing the British 3G auction?54 Neither of
the problems we mention next actually caused any disruption, but they might have done
if circumstances had been adverse.
We think the chief problem was the inadequacy of the deposits that the bidders were
required to put down. These began at £50 million (about $75 million), ratcheting up
to £100 million when the bidding for any licence reached £400 million. This might
not provide an adequate disincentive for a winner in the auction who changed his mind
about wanting a licence after bidding several billions.55 Fortunately, the winners were
uninterested in defaulting and all quickly paid their entire bids. We should have been
stouter in our resistance to the imposition of an upper bound on our original proposal
that deposits should ratchet up with the amounts bid.
With such small deposits, the slow pace at which the auction was run became more
signiﬁcant. The reserve prices were very low (see Section 4.4), and there was, in our view,
53Furthermore one winner claimed afterwards that it had predicted the ﬁnal auction price to within
10% of the actual price, in advance of the auction. And when the prices in the U.K. auction had reached
less than half their ﬁnal levels, a new entrant in Germany announced a willingness to pay over £5 1
2 billion
(18 billion DM) for a similar license in Germany.
More formal evidence is provided by Cable et al (2001) whose analysis of share price movements using
event-study methodology suggests that, at the time of the auction, the market did not feel that the
winners overpaid. Cable et al also “conclude there is no evidence that the outcome of the auction was
anything but eﬃcient”.
54We restrict attention to issues within our terms of reference excluding, for example, grand issues like
whether there should have been one single pan-European auction, or how the terms for any infrastructure
sharing should have been determined.
55From a narrow economic perspective the deposits were clearly too small to ensure there were no
defaults. From the perspective of a manager who might have to explain to others why he has given up
£100 million for nothing, the deposit might suﬃce to persuade him to swallow any doubts he has about
going through with the licence purchase.
Note that the winning bidders were required to pay at least half their bids almost immediately after
winning their licences, and the repayment terms were such that every winner in fact chose to pay its full
bid within days of receiving its licence.
The losers’ deposits were completely refundable.
26an unnecessary maximum of 5% on the size of the minimum increment. The number of
rounds per day was also much smaller than we would have liked and there were many
recesses for holidays and weekends.56 We were very concerned that some external event
might occur during the auction that would lead the bidders to lower their valuations below
what they had already bid. What would have happened if a very negative discovery about
the health implications of mobile phones had been made and reported during the auction?
We were much less comfortable during the 71
2 weeks of the auction than we pretended to
be. There was in fact a substantial dip in technology share prices during the auction that
looked as though it might create a conﬁdence crisis, but this scare proved to be only a
paper tiger at the time, although it looks more like a real tiger now.
7.3. Telecom Auctions Elsewhere
Subsequent telecom licence auctions seem to justify some of our decisions, and re-
inforced our view that the oﬃcials we had worked with had done an impressive job in
managing the auction process.
Facilitating Entry
Our emphasis on the importance of entry was richly conﬁrmed by the miserable failure
of the very next European 3G auction: the Netherlands used an ascending design even
though they were selling exactly as many licences as they had 2G incumbents–precisely
the setting in which we had decided not to risk a pure ascending auction. As one of us
predicted in advance, in the press and in Klemperer (May 2000c), their July auction was
a disaster.57 Only one weak entrant showed up to compete with the 2G incumbents, and
the auction raised just $2
1
2 billion instead of the $8
1
2 billion that the Dutch government
had forecast based on the U.K. experience.
The Italian and Swiss 3G auction also had problems attracting entry, and we think
that the Anglo-Dutch design–that the U.K. would have used if entry had been a concern
there–would have worked better for these countries.
Carefully Thinking Through and Testing the Rules
A recent Turkish telecom auction illustrates the need to think through the implications
of rules very carefully and often subject a design to careful experimental testing. The
56On the other hand, some have argued that an auction of this size should be run slowly to give
shareholders and directors adequate time to monitor and control their ﬁrms’ bidding.
57See also Billions from Auctions: Wishful Thinking (Maasland, 9 June 2000).
27Turkish government auctioned two licences sequentially, but set the reserve price for the
second licence equal to the price at which the ﬁrst licence was sold. One company then bid
much more for the ﬁrst licence than the market thought it could be worth if the company
had to compete with a rival holding the second licence. But the company had rightly
ﬁgured that no rival would be willing to bid that high for the second licence, which
therefore remained unsold, leaving the company without a rival operating the second
licence!
Either careful thought or a few laboratory trials would have exposed this problem.58
Market Structure
The Turkish ﬁasco illustrates another point too: that if the choice of the number of
licences is left to “the market”, the choice is likely to favour the industry. The sale of just
one licence in Turkey both increased industry proﬁts and reduced social welfare relative to
the sale of two. Other auction forms can yield diﬀerent distortions, and it is hard to rule
out distortions in any simple auction form that leaves the number of licences endogenous
to the auction. Though the German 3G endogenous-number-of-licences auction worked
well, this was probably due more to good luck than good design. The same design proved
very vulnerable to collusion and yielded a very poor outcome when used in the Austrian
3G auction. See Klemperer (2002a, b).
Other Issues
The later European 3G auctions suﬀered from other problems too–in particular, ﬁrms’
formation of joint-bidding agreements once they had seen how costly the competitive
U.K. auction was. Ideally, auctioneers and/or anti-trust agencies should prohibit such
agreements.
Furthermore, although on the whole it was a disadvantage to go to market later, the
later countries could have used the information from the earlier auctions to set more
realistic reserve prices. Their failure to do this, combined with their other errors, led to
embarrassing results, especially for the Austrian and Swiss governments.
The failure of most of the 3G auctions after the U.K. auction is often attributed to a
turn-round in market sentiment about the likely proﬁtability of 3G, and to the increase in
ﬁrms’ costs of capital to which this led. But the problem was severely exacerbated in most
58The Turkish government has now trumped this move by making arrangements for a new sale of the
unsold licence, but who will believe that it will stand by its auction rules in the future?
28countries by their choice of auction designs that were inappropriate to their particular
circumstances. One of us wrote shortly after the U.K. auction that other “European
governments would be foolish not to copy the U.K. in auctioning the radiospectrum, but
they would be equally foolish to blindly copy the U.K. design without attention to their
local circumstances” (Klemperer, 2000c). We stand by that advice.
More detailed discussion of all nine 2000-2001 western European 3G auctions can be
found in Klemperer (2002a, b).
8C o n c l u s i o n
We learnt a lot in advising on the telecom auction.
The auction conﬁrmed our view that industrial-organization issues are more impor-
tant than the informational issues on which the auction literature has mostly focused.
In particular, the problems of attracting entrants and dealing with alliances and mergers
are likely to remain major preoccupations of telecom-auction designers for the foreseeable
future. Tackling such problems sensibly requires high-quality market research that keeps
pace with developments in an industry that can change its clothes with bewildering ra-
pidity. We also need more theoretical work on the industrial-organization implications of
major auctions.
The really bad mistake in running an auction is just to take an auction design oﬀ the
shelf, as shown by a comparison of the British and subsequent European 3G auctions.
Auction design is a matter of “horses for courses”, not one size ﬁts all; each economic
environment requires an auction design that is tailored to its special circumstances.
Starting the planning early was invaluable in giving us time to carefully think through
and test our ideas. It was also important to start marketing the auction to potential
entrants early; attracting bidders is not only about good auction design.
We learnt the need to widen our horizons to a whole range of legal and commercial
issues. One cannot aﬀord to defer to special experts in these ﬁelds, because they are
frequently insensitive to the gaming opportunities that various measures may create for
the bidders in a major auction. One must be ready to read the small print and to generate
user-friendly examples of what might go wrong.
The value of computer simulations as an educational tool, and the persuasive power
of laboratory experiments, was also brought home to us.
But perhaps the most important lesson of all is not to sell ourselves too cheap. Ideas
29that seem obvious to a trained economist are often quite new to layfolk. Our marginal
product in preventing mistakes can therefore sometimes be surprisingly large.
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